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I
The U nited States Airborne D ivisions, and Their Role on June 6,1944

By Dennis Carey ‘07

The United States Airborne Divisions that were dropped behind Utah Beach in the
early morning hours o f June 6,1944 played a critical role in the eventual success of
Operation Overlord. On the evening of June 5th, General Eisenhower visited the men o f
the 101st Airborne division as they geared up in preparation for their jump. In making his
rounds among the troops giving his words of encouragement, a paratrooper remarked
“Hell, we ain’t worried General. It’s the Krauts that ought to be worrying now.”1 This is
just one example o f the confidence and fortitude that the men of both the 82nd and 101st
Airborne divisions possessed on the eve of Operation Overlord. Characteristics such as
these would prove to be invaluable as they flew over Hitler’s Atlantic Wall and
parachuted into Nazi occupied France. Despite their optimism, most of the men o f the
Airborne would soon be faced with countless setbacks— setbacks that began before they
even jumped out o f their transport planes.
Things began to go wrong as soon as they began to approach the French coastline.
On their approach to the designated drop zones the transport planes carrying the
paratroopers planned to fly in a tight formation, dropping the men in a set pattern that
would allow for quick assembly into an effective fighting force. Guiding the planes to
their assigned drop zones would be seven teams of pathfinders. These pathfinders were
specially trained and sent in ahead of the main force; at about midnight on June 6th they
would become the first allied soldiers to hit the ground in Nazi controlled France. They
carried with them beacons that were intended to guide the inbound transports to their
targets. Upon landing, the pathfinders found that they had not been dropped where they
intended, as Clay Blair notes in his book Ridgway’s Paratroopers. “Only two of the
seven teams came down in precisely the right place. Owing to navigational and other
errors, some pathfinders were dropped as far as two miles off target, errors that would

1 Ambrose, Stephen A. 1994. D-Day June 6 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War it. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 193.
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have grave consequences.”2 The first wave o f aircraft carrying both the 82nd and 101st
followed the route of the pathfinders towards their drop zones at about 1:00 AM on June
6th, expecting to be led by the pathfinders beacons. Most o f the planes found no beacons
at all. They were not aware that the many o f the pathfinder’s objectives were not yet
accomplished—mainly because they were ordered to be under strict radio silence.
The men flying the transports were the pilots o f the Army Air Force’s Troop
Carrier Command. For many it was their first combat mission. They had not been trained
to deal with night operations, anti-aircraft fire, or foul weather.3 As they came over
France, all hell broke loose. They encountered cloudbanks which decreased their
visibility to nearly nothing, along with heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Germans on the
ground. Many o f the ill-prepared pilots broke their tight V formations and took evasive
action, essentially throwing the airborne divisions into chaos before they could even hit
the ground. Instead o f being dropped in their planned drop zones, there were two entire
divisions of paratroopers scattered over several miles throughout the Normandy
countryside.
The two airborne divisions being dropped each had their own objectives upon
landing. The 82nd Airborne Division was to be dropped into three zones around the town
o f Ste. Mere Eglise and the adjacent Merderet River. Their two main objectives were to
secure the town, which lay to the north of their proposed drop zones, and to move to
destroy bridges over the Douve River to protect the flank o f the invasion force. Their
commanding officer was General Matthew Ridgway; Operation Overlord was only his
fifth parachute jump; it would certainly be a trial by fire. The 101st Airborne Division was
also supposed to be dropped into three zones, further east and closer to Utah Beach than
the 82nd. They were to secure the causeways that crossed the marsh behind Utah Beach
and also move to the south toward Carentan to seize key bridges. They were under the
command o f General Max Taylor.
Both of the airborne divisions would only be mildly successful in achieving their
planned objectives on D-Day, and they each would face many of the same problems. One
problem many paratroopers encountered was the loss of their equipment during the jump:
many of the pilots had not slowed-down enough, causing more intense shock upon the
opening o f the parachutes which in turn caused essential gear to be ripped off. Another
unanticipated problem was a large flooded area around the Merderet River into which
elements of the 82nd were dropped. The Germans intentionally flooded the area, however
reconnaissance had mistaken it for solid ground. Thirty-six paratroopers o f the 82nd
would drown in the marsh, while others were forced to abandon their gear to escape.4 A
typical paratrooper was wearing between 125 and 150 pounds of gear strapped to his
body, which made it much harder to move upon landing.5 Some troopers found
themselves alone when they reached the ground; many were dropped from altitudes that
caused them to land extremely spread out. Troops in both divisions would encounter this
problem, and in some cases elements of the 82nd and the 101st became mixed due to miss

2 Blair, Clay. 1985. Ridgway's Paratroopers, the American Airborne in World War II. Garden City, New
York: The Dial Press, 217.
3 Ambrose, 198.
4 Ambrose, 214.
5 Blair, 219.
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drops. Soldiers were forced to band together and work individually or in small units
towards their rally points.
Following the first waves o f parachutists, at roughly 3:00 AM more C-47s began
to arrive towing behind them glider-borne troops of both the 82nd and 101st. Sixty-nine of
these gliders landed in the area o f Ranville, reinforcing the 101st, forty-nine landed safely
in a zone cleared by the paratroopers earlier. Simultaneously fifty-two gliders landed six
kilometers from Ste. Mere Eglise, intended to reinforce the 82nd. These gliders had many
problems when attempting to land—the clearings in which they were to land were much
too small. They also encountered massive hedgerows, which many o f the gliders slid into
upon landing causing great damage. The glider force would go on to have twenty-five
men killed, one hundred eighteen wounded, and fourteen missing out of nine hundred
fifty-seven total men. The glider troops o f the 82nd took sixteen percent casualties before
it even was in action.6 Many o f these came due to the poor reconnaissance that did not
consider the size o f the Norman hedgerows and the German defenses in the area.
O f the two divisions, the 101st was in much better shape than the 82nd in the early
morning hours of June 6th. The 101st was able to quickly move towards their objective
behind Utah Beach. Twenty-four hours after the drop, the 101st had assembled only about
2,500 of the 6,000 men who had jumped. They had taken Ste. Martin de Varreville along
with Pouppeville, which were both key to the breakout of troops landing on the beach.
Elements o f the 101st were also moving towards Carentan, which General Omar Bradley
hoped could be taken by D+l [the day after D-Day],
Although their force was more scattered, elements of the 82nd were also able to
make headway. O f all of the troops jumping on D-Day, the 505th Parachute Infantry of
the 82nd had one of the best jumps. In the book O u t o f the Blue, James Huston explains
why this occurred: “Its troop carrier planes too had been scattered, but many o f them
were able to circle back and find the drop zone which the pathfinders had clearly
marked.”7 The dangerous decision to circle back allowed for about 180 men, under the
command of Lt. Col. Ed Krause, to assemble.
By 4:00 AM Krause was moving toward Ste. Mere Eglise. He was guided by a
French man into town, who pointed out the locations of the defending Germans. Some
thirty Germans surrendered to Krause and his men, while ten were killed resisting.8 At
4:30 AM, Krause hoisted the American flag on a church steeple in Ste. Mere Eglise.
Americans had liberated their first town in France since 1918.9 Despite being the only
airborne unit to achieve one of its objectives, the 82nd was still much slower to assemble.
Two days after jumping, they had only 2,100 men under unified command.10 Without the
success of the pathfinders that marked the landing area o f the 505th or the fortitude of the
pilots who chose to circle back instead o f simply dropping the men, the 82nd Airborne
division probably would not have accomplished any o f its objectives on D-Day. This is a
prime example of what the paratroopers could have accomplished had their drops gone as
planned.

6 Ambrose, 219-221.
7 Huston, James A. 1972. Out of the Blue, USArmy Airborne Operations in World War II. West Lafayette,
Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 183.
8 Ambrose, 237.
9 Gilbert, Martin. 2004. D-Day. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 141.
10 Huston, 183.
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As groups o f soldiers came together all across the Norman countryside, they were
forced to make due with what they had and do whatever it took to link up into larger
groups. There was little to no chain of command; it was the responsibility o f the Junior
Officers and enlisted men to act independently to link up into larger forces. For many of
these soldiers, Overlord was their first combat jump; American soldiers were not
professionals, but rather citizen soldiers that may have been young teenagers when Hitler
took over France. They were faced with a situation for which they had not trained, and
were forced to improvise in many situations. In their briefings prior to their jumps they
were instructed to do whatever they could to disrupt the Germans, and they did just that.
“The overall missions o f the three airborne divisions were to disrupt and confuse
the Germans so as to prevent a concentrated counterattack against the seaborne troops
coming in at dawn, and to protect the flanks,”11 is Stephen Ambrose’ description o f the
universal objective of the airborne troops from his book D-Day. The men o f the airborne
did exactly that on June 6,1944. They had clear objectives, but it became very clear to
nearly all o f the men that their objectives were largely unattainable due to the scattered
nature in which they were dropped.
Many units began to render the German lines of communication useless in their
efforts to cause havoc behind the German lines. The Germans had been firmly in place in
France for almost five years, and in that time they had grown reliant on more secure land
communication lines rather than radio. When the men o f the airborne began to cut as
many telephone lines as they possibly could, it isolated some German units and left them
out o f contact with their commands. These isolated units were unsure of what was
happening, and were caught off-guard by the paratroopers. Without contact to their high
command, they were forced to wait for other avenues of communication to be established
before taking drastic action. This confusion bought the paratroopers much needed time to
organize.
Since the paratroopers were so scattered, it was hard for the defending Germans to
discern how many o f them actually landed. Sightings of US soldiers all across Normandy
in varying strengths confused the Germans. In addition to not being sure o f where the
main drop was, the Germans were thrown off by a diversion called Operation Titanic.
Titanic consisted o f about 12 commandos, along with about 1,000 dummy parachutists
that were dropped southeast o f Omaha Beach. The commandos were armed with
recordings of chatter and small arms fire that they played over loudspeakers. The German
unit in that section, the 915th Infantry, moved not toward the invasion beaches but the
“allied force” near Isigny. Only two o f the twelve commandos would survive the action.12
By the time the 915th Infantry realized where the real landings were, the Allies
had already established a strong beachhead and were moving inland. Operation Titanic
was just one o f the many deceptions that were put forward to confuse the German
defenders and make the job of the American paratroopers easier. The German high
command knew an invasion was coming, and many of them mistakenly felt that the
invasion at Normandy was not the invasion.13 This blunder would allow the Allies to
breach the Atlantic Wall and establish a firm beachhead on the Normandy coast. From

11 Ambrose, 227.
12 Gilbert, 130-131
13 Ambrose, 303.
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that beachhead would flow an amazing volume o f allied men and firepower that would
open Hitler’s dreaded second front, and eventually penetrate deep into Nazi territory.
The United States Airborne forces that landed in Normandy on June 6,1944 truly
played an integral role in Operation Overlord. It is realized that there were many
shortcomings in the parachute drops of the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions; both units
still contributed to Allied victory at Normandy. The 82nd, despite being scattered,
managed to take Ste. Mere Eglise and hold it until they were supported by seaborne
tanks. The 101st was successful in opening up the causeways behind Utah Beach and
taking out key German artillery batteries.
Although neither division of the U.S. Airborne was successful in all of their initial
objectives, they accomplished their overall mission to disrupt the Germans and cause
confusion behind their lines. The Airborne troop divisions were elite units that were
highly trained and superbly equipped, and they proved their value on D-Day and in the
campaign following it. By June 11, D + 5 ,17,400 paratroopers and glidertroops had
landed in Normandy. The airborne divisions continued to fight as ground units in
Normandy following D-Day for thirty-three more days, until being relieved on July 8th.14
Both divisions of United State parachutists would serve bravely in the campaign for
Normandy. The men o f the airborne, from Privates to Generals, would continue to
impress the Allied high command with their improvisational skills in Operation Overlord
and many subsequent campaigns in the liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe.

14 Huston, 186.
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